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1. Introductory remarks. In developing a new algorithm for estimating
probabilities for tail events Clauset and Woodard have provided an impor-
tant new tool for understanding social events that are rare and momentous.
Such upper-tail large-scale events are notoriously hard to predict because
there is obviously less certainty relative to more typical events. So even
unbiased estimates, which are difficult, are likely to have large confidence
intervals. This is further exacerbated by the measurement error challenges
inherent in nearly all aggregated social science data.
The safety of millions of people depends on understanding the intentions
and actions of terrorist groups. To protect citizens, governments and non-
governmental organizations invest enormous amounts of time and energy
attempting to detect malevolent covert groups and to thwart terrorist at-
tacks. These terrorist events vary dramatically in scope, but are usually
measured in terms of casualties (injuries and fatalities). However, the effect
of terrorist attacks can be quite substantial even with modest casualties;
the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 had “only” three fatalities and yet
had a great effect on the nation’s psyche. So it is considered to be a suc-
cessful terrorist event by observers and scholars of terrorism. Why is this?
It is because the real intention of a terrorist is not just to kill people; this
is an intermediate step. The real intention of terrorists is to make citizens
feel that their government cannot protect them. This is designed to create
unrest and lead to a change of government policies in a direction favored by
the terrorists, or a failure of government, presumably to be replaced with
one that is preferred by the terrorists. Therefore, the more grisly (blood,
gore, beheadings, hanging bodies, etc.) and the more seemingly random the
victims, the greater the psycho-social effect on the population. Examples are
unfortunately plentiful throughout the world: the Taliban wants to replace
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the current US-supported Afghan government, the Moro Island Liberation
Front wants to topple the government in Manila to create a separate Is-
lamist government in the South Philippine islands, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb wants to overthrow the government of Algeria and neighboring
countries to form an Islamic state in Northern Africa, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is still active in trying to destabilize
the current government and replace it with a Marxist—Leninist alternative.
The US State Department actually lists 51 active “official” Foreign Terrorist
Organizations.
The quantity and quality of events data to understand this problem
(where the unit of analysis is a single attack) have improved dramatically,
but are still poor relative to other social science data. Modeling with these
data has yielded some information about the determinants and timing of
terrorist incidents [Enders (2007), Enders and Sandler (1995) and Li and
Schaub (2004), for example]. However, our ability to empirically model ter-
rorist activities currently is limited because these data consist mostly of
observed and recorded terrorist events only. Exceptions include Ed Micko-
lus’ (1982) ITERATE biographical data set of terrorists. So these data do
not constitute the complete set of the activities of these actors since attacks
may get canceled or altered, governments are sometimes motivated not to
report thwarted activities. This dependence on events-only data violates the
standard admonition in the social sciences of not selecting on the outcome
variable [King, Keohane and Verba (1994)]. Measurement issues are also of-
ten a serious problem: the estimated number of casualties for a single attack
can be uncertain, the attacking group may not be obvious, eyewitnesses can
vary in their description, terrorists are motivated to hide processes, meth-
ods and capabilities. However, researchers have little choice but to contend
with such data challenges. I have personally confronted these methodological
issues [Gill and Freeman (2013), Kyung et al. (2012, 2011)].
So into this literature we have a new contribution. Clauset and Woodard
provide a novel method for understanding an important feature of terrorist
data: what is the probability of a catastrophic large-scale event over some pe-
riod of time? Their paper provides a new and highly-valuable tool for assess-
ing risk based on an empirical distribution of known events. This will enable
academic and government analysts to effectively assess, and perhaps plan for,
extremely large (e.g., successful) attacks. Their paper is a major contribu-
tion to this substantive area. Furthermore, this work is a classic contribution
to the Annals of Applied Statistics in the sense that it combines a critical
real-world problem with a new statistical method to produce new insights.
The authors have cleverly combined a threshold specification and alterna-
tive parametric model comparison, with nonparametric bootstrapping. The
threshold here, xmin, is simply a value that allows us to dispense with the
left-hand side of some PDF for modeling purposes. Thus, the right-hand tail
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only is modeled over [xmin :∞), which gives added flexibility by avoiding fit-
ting the more common occurrences at the same time. Obviously, this still
leaves a wide range of parametric specifications defined of this support with
declining density moving to the right, so Clauset and Woodard test common
alternatives with standard likelihood ratio tests. Unfortunately, this is not
enough since the parameters of these PDFs are sensitive to instability in the
empirical data over this region, requiring another step whereby the models
are weighted by their likelihood from a (nonparametric) bootstrap distribu-
tion. This allows them to construct extreme value confidence intervals from
standard theory.
The core of the approach is establishing ptail as the observed proportion
of events equal to or larger than xmin in each of the bootstrapped samples.
Thus, ntail is simply a binomial outcome from m bootstrap samples with
probability ptail. From an assumed distribution, this leads to the probability
of observing a large-scale event (or events). The problem of course is the
selection of this distribution, and the authors compare the discrete power-law
distribution to the log-normal and the stretched exponential distributions
for this purpose. What fixed value of xmin should be used? The lack of a
theoretically driven threshold suggests that an effective strategy would be to
estimate the starting point of the upper tail used. Unfortunately, the authors’
bootstrap models return about half of the estimates of xˆmin around 9–10 but
with a large proportion also at 4–5. Apparently 10 is a good value in that
continuous and discrete tail models produce similar up tail structures, and
this value is used throughout most of the empirical work, except where it is
estimated (e.g., xˆmin = 39 in Section C.2). An extension where estimation
of xmin is conditional on covariates, informed prior distributions or other
relevant information would be a welcome addition to the existing model.
2. Discussion questions. This section discusses some important issues
raised by Clauset and Woodard. As noted, terrorism data is extremely diffi-
cult to model and this section is not intended to diminish the progress made
in their paper.
2.1. Why focus on outlier events? Are bigger events in terms of the num-
ber of fatalities really the “bigger” events? Since the purpose of terrorism is
to exert psychosocial instability, more deaths might not be bigger events. The
key is distance and circumstance. Consider two events in the same month
of May 2013. On May 22 a single off-duty British soldier in the Woolwich
district in South East London was run down by two assailants with their car
and then brutally hacked apart with knives and a machete. A week earlier a
coordinated series of attacks in Iraq killed 449 people. Nearly every citizen
of westernized countries (and more) immediately knew about the May 22
event, and only a small fraction paid attention to the earlier event, despite
the fact that it was 449 times more deadly. Obviously, the London attack
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spread more “terror” because it was closer to supposedly safe citizens and
because Iraq is still perceived as a distant war zone by many. Since all major
terrorist attacks result in psychiatric morbidity for some of the population
[Crimando (2004)], the question is whether in the context of the attack
(place, casualties, damage, media coverage) the number killed is always the
most important factor. Certainly this is not true.
2.2. Is it I.I.D.? The finding that xˆmin is bimodal when estimated in
the context of the bootstrap models suggests that there may be two or more
eras of terrorism in the data. The RAND-MIPT data used covers 1968 to
2007, which is a long period to assume that terrorism is stable and con-
sistent in strategy, effectiveness and methods. Furthermore, RAND-MIPT
data is based on a very broad definition of what constitutes a terrorist event,
where some are better labeled as war crimes. These types of data-labeling
distinctions are a major reason why different terrorism data sets report dif-
ferent events. The authors discuss the i.i.d. issue in the fourth paragraph
of page 16, stating that the “i.i.d. assumption appears to be statistically
justified at the global spatial and long-term temporal scales studied here.”
But this is clearly not the case empirically, as major home-grown terror-
ism in Western Europe has declined dramatically since the demise of the
PIRA, Baader-Meinhof and other groups. Terrorism was virtually unknown
in Eastern Europe before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now Chechen
and Chechen-inspired terror is a regular (and now exported) phenomenon.
India has lately emerged as a major attractor of terrorism. Also, during the
cold war era major powers tended to suppress the definition of terrorism if
it suited their purposes. For instance, the Contras in Nicaragua were never
considered by the US to be terrorists (despite the opposite finding by the
International Court of Justice), even though their alleged acts fall under the
RAND-MIPS definitions.
Fortunately or unfortunately, there is not a single definitive data set for
terrorism events. In addition to RAND-MIPT, frequently used alternatives
include the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland (de-
scribing over 104,000 attacks from 1970 to 2011), ITERATE, the Big, Al-
lied and Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1 [Asal, Rethemeyer and Anderson
(2009), aggregating worldwide lethal attacks from 1998–2005], the World-
wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) from the National Counterterror-
ism Center starting in 2004, data sets collected by government agencies and
more. All of these show various trends over time, and countless articles have
been written about eras of terrorism. For example, Kyung et al. modeled
suicide attack events data in the Middle East and Northern Africa from 1998
to 2004 using a Dirichlet process random effects model and found that 1998
was an exception year that could not be considered as coming from the same
distribution as the other years in the study (there were 273 major terrorist
attacks worldwide in 1998 with an astonishing 741 killed and 5952 injured).
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Fig. 1. GTD2 yearly cycle.
Consider also incidents from the Global Terrorism Database II [LaFree
and Dugan (2008)] as shown to the right. The plot gives a kernel density
for the number of killed by day of the year across the years 1998–2004 with
the 9/11 attacks removed for scale purposes [see Gill and Hangartner (2010)
for details of circular analysis for social science data]. Clearly the data show
a nonuniform pattern by time with a particular bulge around September.
So for this short 7-year period there is both a yearly trend (1998 and 2001
are exceptional) and a within-year trend. Enlarging the time period makes
this effect worse because national and international trends undoubtedly add
more heterogeneity. This issue is addressed in the authors’ Sections 3 with
a discussion of covariates. The authors rerun the tail models under different
circumstances as a means of controlling for the following: different time
periods, same/different country for attacker/target, country economic status
and type of weapon used. Instead of separate models, it would be more
satisfying to see a GLM-style development, which would be easier with the
provided log-normal specification since µ=Xβ is a natural parameterization
in that context.
2.3. Why not be Bayesian about this? Clauset and Woodard state that
“a Bayesian approach would be inconsistent with our existing framework”
(page 6). This may not be necessarily true. Recall the ability in Bayesian
inference for serial updates as new information arrives. That is, posterior
distributions for parameters of interest that were produced from data and
a prior distribution can serve as priors for the same process in a future pe-
riod as new data arrives. The resulting second-stage posterior is the same
form as if both sets of data had arrived at the same time. This learning
process could be used to update the parameters of the tail models spec-
ified in the paper. For instance, Table 1 shows that the log-normal tail
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Fig. 2. Histogram of total killed by data set.
model performs poorly relative to the alternatives. However, if µ and σ in
p(x|µ,σ)∝ x−1 exp[−(logx−µ)2/2σ2] were updated over time (and there is
plenty of time in these data), it may outperform less parametrically flexible
alternatives.
2.4. Distributional forms. The requirement of a specific PDF for the
tail model here is a big convenience. The question is whether any of the
alternatives tried here, or others, are appropriate for these kinds of tails.
Consider the histograms in Figure 2 that show: (1) fatalities in the BAAD
data for allied terrorist groups 1998–2005, (2) suicide attacks in Israel in
the early period of the first “Intifada” November 6, 2000 to November 3,
2003 [see Kyung et al. (2012) for details], (3) the Global Terrorism Database
II fatalities discussed above, and (4) fatalities from the ITERATE data set
1968–1977. The y-axis of the last two is truncated in order not to obscure
the distribution of the tail values with a large range. Obviously these are
only a small set of examples, but it is clear from the heterogeneity of forms
that a single parametric tail model would not be appropriate in all of these
circumstances. This issue is briefly noted in the authors’ Section 5, and is
obviously related to the i.i.d. above discussion.
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3. Final words. I congratulate Clauset and Woodard for taking on a dif-
ficult problem and making substantial progress. This is an excellent contri-
bution to two literatures. My concerns above are mild and primarily reflect
the difficulty in dealing with data that comes from a complex social and
political process with violent actors attempting to hide information about
their characteristics. The heterogeneity in methods, tools, geography and
successes is also not helpful to the statistical modeler. Despite these chal-
lenges, we have learned something about the occurrences of extreme terrorist
events over time from this excellent paper.
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